10 Scholars of religion, sociology, political science, and history have examined this period in Guatemalan history from various perspectives. Those that explore evangelicalism and the Ríos Montt regime focus on how this dynamic played out in Guatemala exclusively, though some discuss the role of American evangelicals within Guatemala and their ties with the Reagan administration. This paper builds on works that expose the involvement of American evangelicals in supporting the Ríos Montt regime, but shifts the focus to examine this phenomenon from the perspective of U.S. international relations and foreign policy making. In viewing these events through the lens of recent scholarship on non-governmental organizations and internationalist Christian outreach, it links the evangelistic aims of U.S. Christians with geopolitical developments abroad, offering new insight into how evangelicals affected US-Central American relations. For the definitive book on Ríos Montt's presidency, counterinsurgency campaigns, and genocide against the Maya, see Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit: Guatemala under General Efraín Ríos Montt, 1982 Montt, -1983 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
From Jesus Freaks to Global Outreach: Sending Spiritual Aid to the Suffering
At just after 3am on the morning of February 4, 1976, a devastating 7.5 MW earthquake struck Guatemala, radiating death and destruction throughout the country. 23,000 people perished and more than 76,000 suffered injuries. 11 The earthquake exacted a staggering economic toll, leaving over a million homeless, with large swaths of Guatemala City and other towns reduced to rubble and critical infrastructure destroyed. 12 Christian relief agencies and churches in the United States responded immediately, sending food, clothing, building supplies, and medical aid to help in the rescue and recovery efforts. The response from these groups proved so effective that within two weeks of the earthquake, the Ford administration's coordinator for disaster relief "urged persons wishing to help to contact church and private sector organizations," rather than government agencies. 13 Although most Guatemalans were at least nominally Catholic at the time, evangelical Christian groups, including the National Association of Evangelicals' World Relief Commission, the Assemblies of God World Missions, and the Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board, delivered substantial aid to their brethren and others suffering from the effects of the earthquake. 14 They also sent in missionaries. Ultimately, the extent and success of the evangelistic outreach that the earthquake triggered turned Guatemala 2010 Ibid. into one of the most Protestant nations in Latin America, a transformation that had profound implications for Guatemalan society and politics. 15 One week after the disaster, Billy Graham chartered a private plane from Mexico with Latin American evangelist Luis Palau to tour the most devastated areas and offer spiritual solace.
The destruction and misery they witnessed overwhelmed them. During a meeting with Guatemalan President Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García, Graham stated that although the Billy
Graham Evangelistic Association had sent in large shipments of food, medicine, and clothing, the aid provided to that point was insufficient to meet the tremendous need. He promised to send more. 16 Yet for Graham and other evangelicals concerned with helping Guatemala rebuild from the tragedy, material assistance alone would not suffice. They believed the nation needed
Christian salvation as well. In a statement to the press, Graham declared that despite the devastation, the earthquake could serve a greater purpose and turn out to be a blessing, as the "'tears shed by Guatemalans may be the way to reconciliation with God.'" 17 Urging the populace to accept that "'peace can only be found in Jesus Christ,'" Graham made it clear that he saw the earthquake as a potential catalyst for mass conversion and, therefore, salvation. 18 Missionminded evangelicals throughout the United States shared Graham's view. The disaster presented a tremendous opportunity for evangelical expansion, and they seized it.
The impulse to send spiritual as well as material aid to help those affected by the disaster reflected core evangelical beliefs about the relationship between evangelization and social action.
Regardless of denomination, evangelicals shared a belief that they must engage in missionary 15 The work or evangelism to "make disciples of all nations," as Jesus commanded in his Great
Commission to the eleven disciples at Galilee. 19 For premillennialist evangelicals such as Graham, this Great Commission figured prominently into their understanding of eschatology.
Premillenialists believed that "Jesus Christ will return personally and visibly, in power and glory, to consummate his salvation and his judgment," as described in the books of Mark, Matthew, Hebrews, Revelation and others. 20 They interpreted these Scriptures as prophecy and trusted that, upon the fulfillment of biblical predictions, Christ would return to usher in the Kingdom of God on Earth. 21 World evangelization played a key role in those apocalyptic predictions, as many evangelicals read scriptures such as Matthew 24:14 ("And this gospel of the kingdom will be preached in the whole world as a testimony to all nations, and then the end will come") and Mark 13:10 ("And the good news must first be proclaimed to all nations") as evidence that evangelism must precede the second coming.
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In an era fraught with debate over liberation theology and the embrace of a social justice rather than a missionary orientation within Catholicism and mainline Protestant denominations, evangelicals held fast to their commitment to global evangelism. 23 In addition to the famous evangelists and major parachurch organizations that delivered assistance to Guatemala, missionaries from a number of small, independent evangelical churches fanned out into the cities and countryside to help the country rebuild and to plant churches. The rapid proliferation of these mostly neo-Pentecostal congregations reshaped not just the religious landscape of Guatemala, but the social and political culture as well. Sociologists and scholars of religion have argued that conversion to Protestantism and, in Latin America specifically, to Pentecostalism, facilitated social mobility among believers and modernization throughout the economy more broadly. 29 In Guatemala, this proved true in the case of the many neo-Pentecostal In addition to the apocalyptic overtones of the disaster itself, neo-Pentecostal churches took advantage of the rush of internal migration from rural villages to Guatemala City that the earthquake jumpstarted. According to Virginia Garrard-Burnett, evangelicals offered these rural immigrants food, shelter, and loans to help them establish themselves in the city-essential assistance that the Catholic Church and local government did not provide. 39 Evangelical churches "actively encouraged the economic improvement of their members by conflating notions of material and spiritual well-being." 40 With their insistence on sobriety and the inculcation of the so-called Protestant work ethic, conversion to Pentecostalism often led to upward social mobility. 41 Additionally, the prayer meetings, women's groups, and associations that evangelical churches organized gave migrants a sense of community, which helped counterbalance the otherwise isolating experience of their new urban lives.
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The particular form of U.S. Pentecostal worship, with its emphasis on ecstatic expression and the experience of an "unmediated, personal relationship with God," drew immigrants in, yet it also blended syncretically with elements of indigenous spirituality that had persisted in rural 38 These authors note that due to its size and organizational structure, the Catholic church could not offer the small-scale, responsive outreach and individualized attention that evangelical groups did. These services proved enormously appealing to newly-arrived migrants, many of whom were nominally Catholic. That Pentecostal worship helped migrants cope with city life was not a new observation; it has been well documented in the sociological literature. Rather it is this phenomenon coupled with the scale of migration that followed the earthquake that made this situation in Guatemala so transformative. villages. 43 This syncretism supplied a comforting familiarity for migrants and aided the vast expansion of neo-Pentecostal churches from the urban core to the rural highlands and beyond. 44 Significantly, although Pentecostalism spread quickly and became indigenized among rural
Mayans, Pentecostal churches in the cities tended to retain an American character and bonds with counterparts in the United States, even as local leaders gradually took over from the original missionaries. 45 El Verbo, with its ties to the Gospel Outreach Church in California, typified this pattern of urban church growth and connectivity.
Gospel Outreach, the Guatemalan Civil War, and Ríos Montt
Shortly after the earthquake struck in 1976, Gospel Outreach Reverend Carlos Ramírez led fifteen missionaries and six of their children from the California church to Guatemala City to assist in the reconstruction efforts and to spread the Gospel. 46 Initially, they focused their efforts on helping local people rebuild their houses. Soon, however, they began to hold regular Bible study meetings in the homes of middle and upper-class residents of Guatemala City. 47 Ríos
Montt joined one of these Bible study groups in 1979 at the urging of a fellow army officer. 
Bringing God and Evangelical Aspirations to Guatemalan Governance
Although the young officers did not realize that Ríos Montt had converted to evangelical Christianity when they asked him to head the junta, the soaring religious rhetoric that animated Having thus expressed his belief that divine will had placed him in power, he pledged to the people of Guatemala that "he and his two junta partners have a mission to revitalize the nation's moral values, extend more human rights, and cut down on corruption." 73 In keeping with evangelical doctrine concerning individual salvation, he stressed that each Guatemalan must work toward improving the country, noting that only "once there is peace in your heart…there 71 Chapin, "Coup Sitrep No. 5," 2. 72 The oppressive apparatus of the army is still in place and there is absolutely no indication that the Junta is about to introduce the far-reaching reforms that the country needs to remove the social, economic and political contradictions that condemn the vast majority of the population to a life of degradation and poverty. offering it as concrete evidence of the sincerity of his promise to bring justice and Biblical rule to his country. 91 Within Guatemala, the anti-corruption measures and weekly sermonettes led to a rapid decline in crime, political repression, and death squad activity in urban centers. 92 Guatemala. 94 Yet Guatemalans whom he regarded as subversive or as communist sympathizers remained outside of his moral compass. During a post-coup press conference, Ríos Montt growled angrily that his enemies should lay down their arms immediately, as "anyone who is outside the law will be executed." 95 Guatemalan villages to determine the loyalty of the residents, classing them white for "friendly,"
red for "enemy," or pink for those "of uncertain allegiance." 97 According to reports, those who supported the government received food, housing and other forms of government largess; those perceived as foes met with "whatever force [was] considered necessary." 98 The army occupied "red" villages, killed suspected guerrillas, and forcibly relocated any remaining residents to "strategic" villages. 99 After the pacification program took effect and the guerrilla forces started to retreat in September 1982, the army returned residents to the abandoned hamlets-re-christened "model villages"-and increased the use of civilian patrols to continue the fight against the insurgency.
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Although human rights watch groups raised concerns about Ríos Montt's military strategy, U.S. foreign policy makers and the Reagan administration cautiously embraced his leadership, finding his religiously-infused rhetoric moderate in comparison to previous regimes and his commitment to fighting the "communist insurgency" encouraging. 101 But tensions between the two governments arose from congressional opposition to providing any military aid to Ríos Montt-specifically its refusal to sell his government the spare helicopter parts it needed to wage war against the guerrillas in the remote, mountainous regions of Guatemala. Washington Rally for Jesus. 107 As the evangelical network within the United States sprang into action, it marshaled supporters and funds from the religious, business, and political communities within which it operated. According to The Nation, Pat Robertson proved particularly influential as a spokesman for Ríos Montt; his televised "appeals for prayers and financial support for the regime. . . .
to American Christians. 109 Fundraising letters from his organization, Love Lift International, emphasized that supporting Ríos Montt's regime would hasten global evangelism, bring freedom to the Guatemalan people, and help defeat communism in the region.
110
These promises resonated with U.S. evangelicals. In September, Ramírez met with pastors in California to establish the Guatemalan Task Force, which worked as the American "base of support" for his organization. 111 This group asserted that "God is the Author of the tremendous changes taking place today in Guatemala," and affirmed their commitment "to support the spiritual revival and the peaceful socio-economic revolution that revival is bringing about," noting "the whole nation of Guatemala will benefit as a result." 112 They partnered with
Youth with a Mission, a major missionary organization founded in 1960, to gather and deliver tools, medicine, clothing, food, and other supplies to the poor and displaced in Guatemala. and Reagan met in Honduras, the last stop on Reagan's tour of Latin America. 116 During an NSC planning meeting prior to the trip, Secretary of State George Shultz had summed up the cautious optimism surrounding Ríos Montt that had developed within the administration, telling Reagan, "I have my fingers crossed on this one. We must make the effort to encourage movement toward democracy; they are doing better now than they have for a long time. But, don't throw your arms around him." 117 The NSC stressed to Reagan that Ríos Montt represented a significant break from past regimes. Reagan's advisors underscored the importance of reassuring the Guatemalan leader that the United States supported him, yet they also instructed:
He must understand that the GOG [Government of Guatemala] image abroad is so bad that it is difficult for the democratic countries, including the United States, to convince their legislatures to appropriate assistance. We should encourage him to continue the human rights progress, which will help us in our effort to convince the Congress that the GOG and USG share a common objective in defeating the guerrillas.
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At the meeting, Ríos Montt gave President Reagan an overview of his programs and reform efforts, emphasizing the progress his regime had made toward protecting human rights. Guatemalans misrepresented the situation on the ground. The guerrillas committed these crimes, Ríos Montt argued, not the army. 123 Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Reagan seemed to take the general at his word, calling him "a man of great integrity." 124 In reality, during the seventeen months Ríos Montt led Guatemala, nearly 86,000 people-mostly Maya-perished or disappeared at the hands of the army. 125 Military actions against Guatemalan villages turned over a million people into refugees. 126 Influenced by Ríos Montt's evangelical faith, Reagan asserted that the Guatemalan government had "been getting a bum rap" from the liberal news media. 127 According to a news correspondent reporting on the meeting in Honduras, "one administration aide said the president was impressed by the intense, forceful style of the Guatemalan as well as Rios Montt's uncompromising faith in God." 128 Afterwards, Reagan expressed his desire to reinstate military aid to the regime, and over the ensuing months his administration worked assiduously to find ways to provide support to Ríos Montt. 129 National Security Advisor William P. Clark assured
Jorge Serrano Elías, a neo-Pentecostal acolyte Ríos Montt had sent to the United States as his personal emissary, that the Reagan administration was "doing its best" to convince Congress to get them to be more responsive to and positive about Guatemala. 130 Evangelicals in the United States also pressured Congress and the administration to extend military aid to Guatemala. In the weeks before and after Reagan's meeting with Ríos Montt, letters from supportive evangelicals poured into Washington. 131 Many emphasized personal connections to Guatemala, referencing missionary work and independent travel there as religious leaders. They often parroted the messages about Ríos Montt that the evangelical press, Christian opinion leaders, and the regime itself put forth. One pastor writing to Reagan noted that he too lamented the "bum rap" he believed Ríos Montt had received in the American press. Based on his conversations with Guatemalans in the rural highlands, he argued:
I believe his government is very humane, progressive and motivated by great integrity. I do hope you will be able to get the modest aid for Guatemala which has been requested. Their helicopter situation is critical, both for defense and evacuation of villages when the communists strike. Accordingly, he came in in a very humble fashion, began to praise the Lord and give glory to His name and tell about how real Jesus was to him and how he wanted to serve God and his country. Most everyone was completely taken off their feet to find him a bubbling over, hallelujah, praise God, shouting charismatic. There didn't seem to be anything superficial about it. He spoke in glowing terms of his relationship with the Lord. The next day, the group boarded military helicopters and flew ninety miles north of the capital to visit a refugee camp in a region occupied by the insurgency. 137 Hogan described the camp in terms that revealed the ideological lens through which both he and his hosts understood 158 As one press release noted, "food, shelter, clothing, and medicine are being provided to those in need; along with Army protection, training of civil patrol groups, and weapons to defend themselves." 1983 coup. 160 The network linking U.S. and Guatemalan evangelicals proved resilient. Although evangelicals enjoyed a period of particular power and visibility during Ríos Montt's presidency, their involvement within and influence on Guatemalan society and politics persisted long after he stepped down.
Ousting "Dios" Montt
The evangelicalism that helped Ríos Montt gain and hold power in Guatemala in 1982
contributed to the unraveling of his presidency in 1983. Although coup rumours had plagued his government since he had declared himself president, they became quite real by June 1983. 161 Disgruntled members of the military and major political parties, including original junta member Gordillo Martínez and a former MLN vice president, complained on television about Ríos Montt's "religious fanaticism" and "use of the presidency as a pulpit to promote his evangelical beliefs." 162 Brigadier General Echeverría asked Ríos Montt to restore constitutional government and stop mixing religion with politics. 163 Army leaders expressed frustration about the power evangelical advisors Bianchi and Contreras exercised within the government. 164 Despite the simmering unrest, Ríos Montt refused to let his advisors resign. 165 The State and Defense Departments expressed concern about the coup rumblings, reiterating their approval of Ríos Montt's counterinsurgency program, progress on human rights, and political moderation. 166 Defense Department experts estimated that the general could stay in power only with army backing; without this support, a coup was imminent. 167 On August 8, stating "that they acted to rid the country of a religious fanatic who has ignored the separation between church and state." 168 Defense Department officials had worried that if the army or a right wing political faction ousted Ríos Montt, the new regime would be as oppressive, corrupt, and abusive as the one he had replaced in 1982. 169 The State Department expected that, "if he is overthrown, it is likely he will be replaced by a reactionary government whose repressive actions will play into the hands of the Marxist guerrillas." 170 These concerns proved prescient. Soon after Mejía took power, reports of human rights abuses multiplied. The army returned openly to the practices of the Lucas regime, utilizing military death squads and political repression to control the countryside. Evangelicals believed religious liberty-the freedom to evangelize-was the core human right, because they saw salvation as the basis for human freedom and the truest cure for man's suffering. When Ríos Montt adopted the distinctive language and leadership style of their particular form of apocalyptic American Christianity, U.S. evangelicals thought they had found in the Central American leader the personification of their most deeply cherished objectives.
Support for such a "Brother in Christ" flowed freely in response.
